While the defining research on the Stuxnet topic doesn’t go this far, Forbes writer Trevor Butterworth went out on a limb to name names along with detailing the warfare aspects: As I noted last week – and as the news media have only begun to grasp – Stuxnet represents a conceptual change in the history
…we have just published a lengthy analysis that considers many of these questions, as well as discussing some of the characteristics of this fascinating and multi-faceted malicious code. The report is already available here, and will shortly be available on the ESET white papers page.
There have been recent articles with fantastic titles such as “New threat: Hackers look to take over power plants” and “Hackers Target Power Plants and Physical Systems” in the wake of the Stuxnet worm that targeted certain industrial control systems (ICS). The reality is that hackers targeting ICS is nothing new. I am not clear
Kim Zetter’s article for Wired tells us that “SCADA System’s Hard-Coded Password Circulated Online for Years” – see the article at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/07/siemens-scada/#ixzz0uFbTTpM0 for a classic description of how a password can have little or no value as a security measure. Zetter quotes Lenny Zeltser of SANS as saying that ““…anti-virus tools’ ability to detect generic versions of