CIPAV, the "Computer and Internet Protocol Address Verifier" spyware apparently used by the FBI to monitor activity on the computers of suspects, may not seem the hottest news item around: in fact, my friend and former colleague Craig Johnston and I put together a paper – Please Police Me - on the issues involved with policeware versus
My latest blog for SC Magazine's Cybercrime Corner looked at the recent APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) attack on RSA, in the light of Uri Rivner's blog on the implementation of the attack. Unfortunately, the exact nature of the target and damage remains somewhat obscure, so while I certainly consider Rivner's blog worth reading, I also found myself
You may not be aware that ESET writers have been supplying blogs to SC Magazine for a while now. Recently, Randy Abrams and I were drafted in after the original contributors moved on, and we started contributing this week: Poachers and Gamekeepers considers whether there is a conflict of interest when AV companies work with
While most of the recent media interest in Stuxnet has centred on the New York Times story, there’s been some thoughtful research published that considers it as just one aspect of larger issues: cyberwarfare, cyberespionage, cybersabotage and so on.
Tony Dyhouse writes in SC Magazine about the political implications for the security community of the Stuxnet and Wikileaks incidents. The link has also been added to the Stuxnet resources post at /2011/01/03/stuxnet-information-and-resources/5731 on 14th January 2011.. David Harley CITP FBCS CISSP
…While there are those who think that I’ve been in the anti-virus industry since mammoths roamed the Surrey hills, most of my computing career has actually been in medical informatics, though as you might expect from what I do now, documentation, security and systems/user support played a large part most of that time….
Perhaps you're getting as tired of this thing as I am (though with the information still coming in, I'm not going to be finished with this issue for a good while, I suspect). But without wishing to hype, I figure it's worth adding links to some further resources. There's a very useful comment by Jake
Kim Zetter’s article for Wired tells us that “SCADA System’s Hard-Coded Password Circulated Online for Years” – see the article at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/07/siemens-scada/#ixzz0uFbTTpM0 for a classic description of how a password can have little or no value as a security measure. Zetter quotes Lenny Zeltser of SANS as saying that ““…anti-virus tools’ ability to detect generic versions of
Wearing my vendor-independent Apple/smartphone commentary hat, I've just posted a couple of blogs on the Mac Virus site that some of you might find of interest. OK, suit yourselves. ;-) "Touching (or Bumping) Base" addresses a mixed bag of issues: Charlie Miller's presentation on fuzzing for "20 zero-day holes … in closed source Apple products"