So who’s to blame? First and foremost, the victimizers. Well, persistent victims, yes. And anyone in the security industry who pushes the TOAST principle, the idea that all you have to do is buy Brand X and you never have to take responsibility for your own security. Though, of course, “who’s to blame?” is the wrong question: what matters is “how do we fix it?”
Here's something I noticed today on the ESET Facebook page at http://www.facebook.com/esetsoftware. (There is, of course, also an ESET North America page at http://www.facebook.com/esetusa, but this is the European page. There are lots of local ESET pages too, too many to list here.) As Facebook continues to attract more pages and videos containing malware, we
At a time where the West is, generally speaking, not at the top of its game economically, I can see why defence contractors, like anyone else, are anxious to save money, but outsourcing critical systems purely for economic advantage in the hope of submitting the lowest tender is a risky strategy.
The TDSS botnet, now in its 4th generation, is seriously sophisticated malware, which is why we've spent so much time writing about it: the revision of the paper The Evolution of TDL: Conquering x64 that will be up on the white papers page shortly runs to 54 pages and includes some highly technical analysis, including the detail on
So, a (long) while ago I wrote about the Haiti earthquake, with some commentary about the intersection between natural disasters, Black Hat SEO, scare tactics for education in good security practice, plus some links relevant to the earthquake. Well, I'm certainly not ashamed of that blog, though I haven't thought about it for a long time,
Here's a diagnostic window that your shouldn't panic over, certainly if some cold-calling scammer directs you to it by persuading you to run a diagnostic on your own system. But I'm getting ahead of myself. You might think I've blogged more than enough about support scams already – you know, where someone calls you out
I encountered an old acquaintance today. Tip of the hat to Peter Radatti for pointing me towards an article by John Breeden II that proposes a very familiar idea: the Good Virus. (One that also often pops up in the form of the Good Worm, such as the various hues of Code that were proposed
@RedNose commented on the blog I put up recently about the tool my Russian colleagues have made available for dumping TDL's hidden file system: I'm going to respond here in case anyone else is confused about this. "I ran the tool and it did not show anything. Does it mean that TDSS is not present?"
…on the Twitter account owned by LulzSec that they had turned their attention to the NHS. Curiously enough, they seem to have been restrained and even responsible: while there’s an image out there of a message they claim to have sent to an administrator at an unidentified NHS site, they blacked out the details.
First: a link to another article for SC Magazine's Cybercrime Corner on password issues: Good passwords are no joke. However good your password is, your privacy still depends on rational implementation by the service provider. Also, one of the articles that sparked off that particular post: ESET Ireland's excellent blog post on a survey carried